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Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on the response of business investment to tax incen-
tives. I use the variation provided by recent reforms to the Mexican corporate tax system,
including the elimination and reintroduction of accelerated depreciation allowances applica-
ble to investment undertaken outside the three main Mexican metropolitan areas. I show
that investment is very sensitive to changes in tax variables and interest rates, with an es-
timated elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost around −2.0. The results are
robust to different specifications and instrumental variables approaches. The large elasticity
is shown to be the result of the large cross sectional variation in the user cost of capital and
also a product of the small open economy nature of the Mexican economy. In particular, large
investment responses of plants owned by multinational firms and a elasticity of imported as-
sets considerably larger than that of domestically purchased goods. Furthermore, the use of
panel data at the establishment level allows me to identify the discrete nature of investment
decisions and to show that the capital accumulation pattern is consistent with nonconvex
adjustment costs and irreversibilities, similar to those found for the US. Thus, the large
elasticity compared to US estimates cannot be attributed to differences in adjustment costs.
Finally, I provide evidence that the large investment response is not an artifact of misreport-
ing or tax evasion since the elasticity of investment in other assets such as transportation
equipment and land, which is harder to misreport, is also high.
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1 Introduction
There is a large number of studies estimating the elasticity of business investment with respect to
the user cost of capital. A recent wave of empirical work since the early 1990s has used panel data
and clever estimation techniques to generate a new consensus estimate of this elasticity between
−0.5 and −1.0, implying that taxes, interest rates, and depreciation rules affect investment
decisions.1
The study of the responsiveness of investment to the user cost in other countries provides a
natural robustness check for the results found using US data.2 However, the available empirical
evidence for developing economies is scarce due to data limitations and the complex way in
which income from capital is taxed in many of these countries. This paper tries to partially
fill this gap in the literature. Using a confidential panel database of Mexican manufacturing
establishments, I estimate the elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost. Correcting
my estimates for possible endogeneity and measurement error using instrumental variables (IV),
my results show that the elasticity is significantly greater than unity, with a preferred estimate
around −2.0.
This large elasticity is partially a result of using large cross sectional variation in the user
cost of capital.3 Previous to 1999, Mexican depreciation rules included the option to expense
the present discounted value (PDV) of all future depreciation allowances using a favorable dis-
count rate. Notably, only investments undertaken outside the three main metropolitan areas
(Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey) applied for this preferential tax treatment. In 1999
this system was eliminated to overcome a shortfall in government revenue caused by lower in-
ternational oil prices. This policy change is arguably exogenous to firm investment decisions
providing potentially valid instruments (this provision implied an increase in the user cost of
34% outside these metropolitan areas, compared to an increase of 19% within these areas). The
1See Chirinko (1993), Caballero (1999) and Hassett and Hubbard (2002) for reviews of the literature.
2See Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1996) for a cross country analysis for 14 members of the OECD.
3This large cross sectional variation comes from: Industry variation driven by economic depreciation rates;
pure time series variation driven by interest rates; time series and industry level variation driven by changes in
the ratio of prices of capital goods and output; and time series, industry and regional variation driven by the
changes to the system of depreciation allowances.
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results of this paper are robust to different specifications and the use of IV strategies, including
dynamic panel models.
The small open economy nature of the Mexican economy is shown to be another possible
determinant of the large investment response. I show that the investment response of plants
owned by multinational firms is large. My results suggest that investment by US, British,
German and Swiss multinationals responded more to changes in the user cost than investment
by other multinationals or domestic plants.
The small open economy nature is also recognized in the supply side of capital as a possible
determinant of the high responsiveness of investment. Specifically, I show that the elasticity
of imported assets is considerably larger than that of domestically purchased capital. This
provides evidence of a response of domestic prices to tax incentives: managers adjusted more
their investment in the international market (with fixed prices), while in the domestic market
both prices and investment reacted.
The use of data at the establishment level also allows me to identify the discrete nature
of investment, and show that investment is consistent with nonconvex adjustment costs and
irreversibilities, similar to those reported in Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1995) for US
manufacturing plants. Specifically, plants that according to a neoclassical model should disinvest
rarely do so, while plants with capital shortfalls do invest, and this response is increasing in the
size of the capital shortfall. This finding implies that the larger elasticity compared to US
estimates is not caused by differences in the adjustment cost functions between Mexico and the
US.
Arguably, if after investment incentives were removed managers were able to include capital
expenditures as operating expenses, then the large elasticity could be just an artifact of mis-
reporting. However, I show that the elasticity of investment in transportation equipment and
land is also high. Since these assets are harder to misreport, this finding suggests that the large
investment response is not due to misreporting or tax evasion.
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 presents the review of the literature, with particular
emphasis on the study of investment incentives in Mexico. Section 3 describes the reforms to the
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Mexican corporate tax system. Section 4 briefly describes the database. Section 5 outlines the
main empirical strategy and its results. Additional results aimed to explain the large estimated
elasticities are presented in Section 6. Section 7 analyzes tax policy implications. Section 8
concludes. Finally, a detailed description of the database can be found in Appendix A.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Sensitivity of investment to the user cost
One decade ago, the empirical evidence suggested that taxes and interest rates have little effect
on investment.4 The estimated models implied implausibly large adjustment costs, in the range
of one to five dollars per dollar of investment. However, several recent papers have been successful
in explaining the reasons behind this result, and in some cases even correct the estimation
techniques and show that investment is in fact sensitive to changes in the user cost of capital.
The small estimated elasticities can be explained, for example, by monopolistic competition
in the capital goods market, which may cause prices and not quantities (investment) to react
(Goolsbee (1998)). Moreover, there is a bias towards finding small effects of the user cost on
investment if the common assumption of convex adjustment costs does not hold. Dixit and
Pindyck (1994) argue that irreversibility might create ranges where investment does not react
to changes in the user cost. Caballero et al. (1995) show that the pattern of investment is
consistent with the presence of irreversibilities and nonconvexities, and estimate the long run
elasticity of the capital stock with respect to its user cost to be close to −1.0, larger by an order
of magnitude than those of the previous literature.5
Furthermore, one of the main explanations for the small empirical elasticities is measurement
error in the user cost. Panel data at the asset, firm or plant level has been used to address this
problem. For example, using a panel at the industry level, Goolsbee (2000) shows that the user
cost variable has measurement error and that, after correcting the estimates using instrumental
variables, the results show that taxes affect both prices and investment.
4See surveys by Chirinko (1993), Caballero (1999) and Hassett and Hubbard (2002).
5Doms and Dunne (1993) also show that plant level investment is composed of large and discrete episodes.
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Using a panel of firm level data from COMPUSTAT, Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994)
show that measurement error is present not only in the tax variables, but also in the measure of
Tobin (1969) Q. Their IV estimate of the elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost
lies between −0.5 and −1.0, close to the neoclassical prediction and equivalent to adjustment
costs of only 10 cents per dollar of investment. More recently, Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer
(1999) also use firm level variation in the cost of capital to estimate the elasticity of the capital
stock with respect to its user cost. Their preferred IV estimate is close to −0.25.
An important fundamental concern with the empirical estimation is the difference between
short and long run dynamics. House and Shapiro (2004) link this difference to firm expectations
about future tax changes and show that for sufficiently forward looking investment in long lived
assets, the elasticity to temporary changes in tax parameters is nearly infinite. These authors
analyze the 2002 and 2003 changes to depreciation allowances and find that prices reacted very
little while investment increased for the types of capital that qualified for bonus depreciation.
In contrast, Desai and Goolsbee (2004) argue that depreciation rules were already close to full
expensing, and thus these reforms produced only small percentage changes in the user cost,
which explains the small effects on investment they find.
2.2 Investment incentives in Mexico
The economic analysis of tax investment incentives in developing countries requires consider-
ation of some additional factors compared to developed economies. Auerbach (1995) provides
a detailed discussion on this topic and concludes that the two main differences in the analysis
are the consideration of the effects of investment incentives on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),
and the possible exogeneity of the required after-tax return on investment.6
Evidence on the effect of investment tax incentives in Mexico is scarce. Most of the analysis
of investment that has been done at the aggregate or micro level has not considered the effects of
taxes on investment.7 For example, Gelos and Isgut (2001a,b) analyze the investment behavior
6See Hines and Gordon (2002) for a review of the theory and empirical results on international taxation and
FDI.
7Notably, many papers that study the impact of cash flow, liquidity and financial liberalization on investment
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of Mexican and Colombian manufacturing plants following the methodology of Caballero et al.
(1995). They do not construct a measure of the user cost of capital, but only use one of its
non-tax components (the relative prices of capital goods and output) in order to identify the
adjustment function. Moreover, their relative price parameter does not vary across industries.
Gelos and Isgut (2001b) find that investment patterns are consistent with the presence of irre-
versibilities but not nonconvexities. This contrasts with my results in Section 6.3, where I show
that investment of Mexican manufacturing plants is consistent with both irreversibilities and
nonconvexities.8
The general omission of tax considerations is striking given the fact that tax incentives for
investment in Mexico have undergone large changes since 1950.9 In fact, those changes motivated
Feltenstein and Shah (1995) to develop a computable general equilibrium model to study the
impact of taxes on investment in Mexico. Their calibrations show that taxes do affect investment
and that for two reforms with the same revenue impact, reductions to the corporate income tax
rate are more effective to incentive investment than investment tax credits.10
In a time series framework, Shah and Slemrod (1995) analyze the effects of taxation on the
aggregate flow of FDI to Mexico during the 1960-1990 period. Their results suggest that the FDI
flow is very sensitive to taxes. The estimated elasticities also imply that the tax effect on FDI
in the form of new transfers from abroad is larger than the one on FDI in the form of retained
earnings of multinationals. Also using a time series framework, Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2004) develops a
forecast model for Mexican investment where he proxies the tax component of the user cost by
including the ratio of income taxes (both personal and corporate) to GDP as an explanatory
variable in his aggregate error correction model of investment. The coefficient of this term goes
in the wrong direction although is not significantly different from zero.11
also omit the consideration of taxes. See Gelos and Werner (1999), Babatz and Conesa (1997), for example.
8The differences can be caused by the different time period of study (Gelos and Isgut (2001b) study plants
during 1984-1994, while I use 1994-2002). The difference can also be caused by the different methodology to
calculate both the capital stock and the user cost, as explained in Section 4 and in the Appendix A.
9See Feltenstein and Shah (1995) for a summary of the changes between 1950-1985.
10Decreasing the corporate tax rate from 42% in 1987 to 35% in 1988 would have yielded an increase in
manufacturing investment of 4.9%, while a 10% investment tax credit in 1988 would have only increased it by
2.2%.
11Pe´rez-Lo´pez (2004) attributes his finding to large measurement error in his average effective tax rate (the
corporate and personal income taxes are fully integrated, so it is not possible to get the corporate share of revenue).
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At the micro level, Schwartzman (1985) finds no support for the view that taxes affect
investment in Mexico. He models the behavior of investment in a small open economy and
suggests that real exchange rate fluctuations contributed to the large volatility of Mexican
investment during 1975-1985 (through its effect on Q). Schwartzman (1985) estimates structural
Q-model equations for investment in a panel of 20 Mexican firms. His results support the view
that Q-model regressions explain the behavior of investment in Mexico, but also that taxes play
a very secondary role in affecting investment. His tax-unadjusted regressions econometrically
outperform the tax-adjusted regressions. The contrasting results reviewed in this section, pose
the question of whether taxes affect investment in Mexico; answering this question is the goal
of this paper.
3 The Mexican corporate tax system and its recent reforms
3.1 General overview of the corporate tax system
According to Gordon and Ley (1994), the Mexican and the US tax systems are relatively similar.
“Both federal governments tax corporate income in virtually the same rate (34 percent in Mexico
and 35 percent in the US), and both have a progressive personal tax with a maximum rate of
35 percent in Mexico and 39 percent in the US” (Gordon and Ley 1994, p. 436).
The differences come from the definition of taxable income.12 The Mexican tax system
is completely neutral with respect to inflation, while the US system is not. Also, there is
full integration of the personal and corporate tax system in Mexico.13 Finally, the Mexican
Constitution mandates firms to distribute 10% of pre-tax income to workers and employees each
fiscal year. This profit sharing scheme increases the burden of corporate taxation.
It should be noted that investment tax credits are small and very specific in Mexico (tar-
geted to agriculture mostly). Therefore, since the following analysis focuses on manufacturing
12Also, the US government relies more on the payroll tax while the Mexican government collects a substantial
amount of funds through the Value Added Tax.
13Dividends from Mexican firms are tax-exempt as well as all capital gains realized in the Mexican Stock
Exchange (Bolsa Mexicana de Valores). Therefore, I omit the discussion of the different predictions of the views
of dividend taxation (see Poterba and Summers (1985)).
7
establishments, I omit its consideration.
The corporate tax rate is a flat 34% (1994). Depreciation allowances are based on a straight
line method of deductions for fixed assets. The specific percentage deduction for each asset is
specified in the Income Tax Law (Ley del ISR). For machinery and equipment, this percentage
also depends on the industry in which it is used. Table A-1 shows annual depreciation rates
applicable to selected assets, and to machinery and equipment in selected industries.
By 1994, depreciation rules also included the option to immediately expense the PDV of
future depreciation allowances using a fixed (and favorable) real discount rate of 5%.14 For
example, in the case of the purchase of a building, with annual depreciation deductions of 5%
(20 years of straight line depreciation), the law allowed the option to immediately expense 62% of
the acquisition cost, which is considerably higher than the 35% PDV of depreciation allowances
when using the market real riskless rate.
Importantly for the following analysis, this Optional Accelerated Depreciation (OAD, or so
called “Depreciacio´n Inmediata”), was only applicable to investment expenditures undertaken
outside the three main metropolitan areas of the country, i.e., Mexico City, Guadalajara and
Monterrey. For many years, this system was used by the government to promote decentraliza-
tion.15
3.2 Recent reforms to the corporate tax system
In the aftermath of the Tequila Crisis (1994-1995), the Mexican government approved some mea-
sures designed to increase economic activity, growth and investment. These measures included
a decrease in the discount rate to calculate the OAD rate from 5% to 3%. This change consid-
erably increased the value of depreciation allowances. In the previous example, it represented
the immediate expense of 74% of the original investment instead of 62%.
By the end of 1998, the federal government presented to the Congress a series of reforms
designed to increase government revenue collections. The dependence of Federal Government
14This favorable rate was 7.5% before 1991.
15These three metropolitan areas represent 38.1% of national manufacturing production and 22.8% of Mexican
population.
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revenue on oil, combined with low international oil prices made necessary to take some politically
costly actions. Since the elimination of special regimes for the Value Added Tax did not get
support in Congress, other measures were proposed, including some aimed at increasing the
effective tax rate on corporations.
The approved law included an increase of the corporate tax rate to 35% and the elimination
of the OAD system. The OAD was replaced with a system of differential taxation of retained
earnings over distributed earnings. Specifically, retained earnings were taxed at 30% and distrib-
uted profits were subject to the full 35% tax rate while the 5%×(Taxable Income) tax liability
was deferred until distribution.
During 2001, the federal government promoted the discussion of a fundamental tax reform.
The discussion included the academia, tax advisors, corporations, and the government. At the
end, failures in the political negotiations at the Congress resulted in a new tax law that was far
from a fundamental reform. Nevertheless, the corporate tax rate was gradually decreased from
35% in 2002 to 32% in 2005 (1% each year). Moreover, the OAD system was reinstalled with a
discount rate of 6% while the preferential treatment of retained earnings was abandoned. The
OAD immediate expense in the approved system, however, was not allowed to be made in the
year of acquisition, but until the next one.
The government noticed that the system of OAD was considerably less effective than the
one in effect in 1998 (both because of the high discount rate and because of the deferral rule).
The Income Tax Law was further modified in 2003 decreasing the discount rate to calculate the
OAD to 3% and allowing the immediate expense to be done partially (one third) in the year of
acquisition, and the rest (two thirds) in the following year. Moreover, for the fiscal year 2004
the deferral rule was two thirds in the first year and one third in the second; for fiscal year 2005
and beyond, it was possible to expense the full PDV in the same year of acquisition. Finally, in
2005 the corporate tax rate was again reduced 1% each year from 30% to 28% in 2007.
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3.3 Time series behavior of tax parameters during 1994-2002
The top panel of Table 1 summarizes the tax rules applicable in each year. It is useful to consider
its effects on the PDV of depreciation allowances, the cost of capital and the effective marginal
tax rate. Section 4 and Appendix A describe in detail the construction of these variables.
The present value of depreciation allowances was calculated using the standard formula:
z =
T∑
t=0
NDR× V
(1 + ρ)t
, (1)
where, z: present value of depreciation allowances, ρ: real discount rate (for a plant in the
OAD region, is the rate allowed by the government to calculate the accelerated depreciation;
for a plant in the 3MMA region, is the riskless long term interest rate), NDR: is the Normal
Depreciation Rate, i.e., the percentage of the purchase value of an asset that the government
allows to deduct each year, V is the purchase value of an asset, and T is the number of years
until full depreciation is achieved, according to NDR.
The cost of capital was estimated using the well known derivation in Jorgenson (1963):
COC =
pK
pY
× (r + δ)× (1− Γ)
(1− τ) , (2)
Γ = ITC + τz, (3)
where, COC: user cost of capital, pK : price of capital, pY : price of output, r: required rate on
return (the riskless rate, ρ, plus a time varying risk premium), δ: economic depreciation rate,
ITC: investment tax credits, and τ : corporate tax rate.
The effective tax rate (i.e., the hypothetical tax rate on pure economic income that yields
the same cost of capital as the actual regime of depreciation allowances and corporate tax rate)
was calculated as:
ETR =
(r + δ)× (1− Γ)− (r + δ)× (1− τ)
(r + δ)× (1− Γ)− δ × (1− τ) , (4)
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where, ETR: Effective Tax Rate.16
The bottom panel of Table 1 presents, as an example, the time series behavior of these tax
parameters for investment in machinery and equipment in the automobile parts industry. The
table distinguishes between the values for plants located inside the main metropolitan areas
(3MMA) and those that qualified for the OAD. As is evident from the table, the 1999 reform
implied a differential increase in the user cost for the two regions.
4 Data
4.1 Encuesta Industrial Anual (EIA), 1994-2002
The Annual Industrial Survey (Encuesta Industrial Annual, or EIA) is conducted by the Mexican
Statistical Agency, INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica, Geograf´ıa e Informa´tica), and is
housed at its headquarters in Aguascalientes, Mexico. In this study I use the most recent
panel: 1994-2002. INEGI follows a non-random sampling procedure to determine the group of
manufacturing plants that would be surveyed. This procedure is described in INEGI (2005) and
summarized in Appendix A.
The EIA panel consists of 7,171 manufacturing establishments in 205 6-digit industries, which
excludes maquiladoras, basic petrochemical plants, refineries and also micro-industry plants (i.e.,
plants with less than 15 employees). A small random sample of new plants is added every year.
The variables used in the empirical analysis include:
· Location: state and municipality.
· Industry: 9 (2-digit) “subsectores”, 50 (4-digit) “ramas” and 205 (6-digit) “clases”.
· Employment: total payroll.
· Profit Sharing: total payments to employees and workers due to the profit sharing scheme
(10% of pre-tax income).
16The ETR is implicitly defined by:
r = (1− ETR)× (COC − δ). (5)
Solving for ETR derives in Equation 4.
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· Output: value of production.
· Assets: Asset values, purchases, sales, depreciation and write-offs. This information is bro-
ken down into five categories of asset types: Machinery and equipment, constructions and
facilities, land, transportation equipment and other assets. Asset values and depreciation
are reported at historic costs or gross book value.
4.2 Other plant level data sources
I also use aggregate information (at the 6-digit industry level) for asset values and depreciation
(both at historic cost) from the previous panel of the EIA (1984-1994). This information was
averaged over the years to estimate industry economic depreciation rates. These rates were used
in the calculation of the user cost of capital. I imputed these rates at the 4-digit industry level
in the 1994-2002 panel of plant level information.
INEGI officials allowed me to merge EIA data with information for assets values at market
prices (or replacement costs) from the 1994 Industrial Census, for a subsample of 4,997 plants.
The information was also broken down into five asset categories: machinery and equipment,
constructions and facilities, land, transportation equipment, and other assets.
In 1994, the EIA was jointly surveyed with a Technology Database (Encuesta Nacional de
Empleo, Salarios, Tecnolog´ıa y Capacitacio´n, ENESTYC). INEGI officials provided matched
information regarding country of equity ownership for a subsample of 6,845 plants. The ques-
tionnaire asked the ownership percentage for the following countries: Mexico, USA, Germany,
Canada, France, Netherlands, Japan, UK, and Switzerland.
4.3 Construction of variables
Different variables were constructed for the analysis. Given the available data on the EIA, it
was not possible to estimate models at the firm level, but only at the plant level. The details are
presented in Appendix A at the end of the paper. Here, I just briefly summarize the process:
· Region: Plants were classified according to its location inside or outside the three main
metropolitan areas (3MMA), since only those outside qualified for the accelerated depre-
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ciation.
· Capital stock (K): I use the perpetual inventory method, taking as the initial capital
stock the market value of assets from the 1994 Industrial Census. Depreciation rates were
estimated using gross book value depreciation and asset values as explained in the Data
Appendix.17
· Gross Expenditures (GE): is the sum of all assets purchased either in the domestic market
or imported from abroad.
· Net Expenditures (NE): equals gross expenditures minus economic depreciation.
· Retirements (R): is the value of sales of assets, reported at market value.
· Investment (I): is the sum of gross expenditures minus retirements.
· Cash Flow (CF ): is estimated by multiplying the profit sharing amount by 10.18
· Cost of Capital (COC): it is estimated at the 4-digit industry level for the two different
regions (3MMA or OAD) using Equation 2 and the following inputs:
– The capital-output price ratio (pK/pY ): is the output deflator for each 2-digit industry
divided by the price index for fixed capital accumulation.19 It was set equal to 1 in
2002.
– Corporate Tax Rate (τ): comes from Income Laws, and was adjusted to include the
burden of the profit sharing rate.
– Real required rate of return (r): was assumed equal to the real riskless interest rate,
plus a time varying risk premium equal to the difference between the short term
nominal interest rate on private and government bonds.20
17Previous studies that have used the EIA use the initial reported gross book value of assets as the initial
capital stock in the perpetual inventory method. This procedure can yield misleading measures in short panels
for two reasons. First, this method approximates the market value of assets by the book value of assets in the
initial year, relying on the length of the panel to erode this bias. Second, the reported book value in the EIA is
not net of depreciation, and thus might include assets already fully depreciated. The use of market value figures
from the 1994 Census allows me to overcome these problems.
18As previously noted, Mexican Constitution mandates firms to distribute 10% of pre-tax profits. This is the
same approach that Gelos and Werner (1999) followed to get a measure of cash flow.
19The first comes from the Mexican National Income and Product Accounts and the second from Banco de
Me´xico.
20The real riskless rate is the rate on UDIBONOS (inflation indexed long term government bonds). The risk
premium is the difference between the rate on private commercial paper and CETES (short term government
bonds).
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– Present discounted value of depreciation allowances (z): calculated based on Equa-
tion 1 using normal depreciation rates or the optional accelerated depreciation rates
according to each plant location (OAD or 3MMA), from Income Tax Laws.
– Economic depreciation (δ): estimated at the 6-digit industry level using data from
the 1984-1994 EIA panel, and assigned at the 4-digit industry level for each plant in
the 1994-2002 EIA panel.
4.4 Other minor sources
Other series needed for the analysis were derived from different sources. Price indices and
different real and nominal interest rates were obtained from the Mexican Central Bank (Banco
de Me´xico).
4.5 Summary statistics
Summary statistics for the most relevant variables are presented in Table 2. The top panel shows
the mean, standard deviation, quartiles and number of observations for the cost of capital, the
different investment and capital expenditure variables, and cash flow and output to capital ratios.
The middle panel shows the means by subgroups of regions (3MMA region or OAD region). For
all variables the difference in the means is statistically different from zero. Finally, the bottom
panel shows means for plants with majority ownership by Mexicans or foreigners.
5 Main empirical specification and results
In this section I analyze investment in machinery and equipment. Investment in other types
of assets (i.e., constructions, land and transportation equipment) is considered in Section 6.4.
As noted in Section 4, the unit of analysis is the manufacturing establishment (plants). Due to
confidentiality reasons, and mainly due to the EIA questionnaire itself, it was not possible to
merge information at the firm level. This has the drawback of not been able to estimate models
with financial variables, i.e., Q-type models like Summers (1981). Before turning to the specific
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firm model used to derive the regressions, it is useful to consider a pure differences-in-differences
approach.
5.1 Differences-in-differences regressions
Given the potential exogenous nature of the 1999 and 2002 reforms, I regress investment rates on
a dummy equal to one in the years in which the Optional Accelerated Depreciation system was
in effect (1994-1998 and 2002), a dummy equal to one if the plant is located outside the three
main metropolitan areas (i.e. where the OAD system applies), and the interaction between the
two:
Iit
Kit−1
= αi + β1OAD
period
it + β2OAD
region
it + β3(OAD
period
it ×OADregionit )
+ηt + ²it, (6)
where, I: investment, K: capital, OADperiod: equals one in 1994-1998 and 2002, OADregion:
equals one for plants outside the main metropolitan areas, α: plant fixed effects, η: year fixed
effects (included when OADperiod is excluded), and ²: the disturbance term.
Table 3 presents the results of these regressions. The positive and significant coefficient on
the interaction term suggests that plants in OAD regions reduced more their investments in
the years in which the accelerated depreciation was eliminated compared to plants that did not
qualify for this special tax treatment. The last four columns specifically exclude the Tequila
Crisis (1994-1995). Note that the coefficient on the interaction term is robust to the inclusion
of year fixed effects instead of the OADperiod dummy. Therefore, the results show that even
without considering the large cross sectional variation in the user cost induced by the reforms,
the effect of the reform on investment is large. The task of the next subsections is to use this
variation and introduce a more elaborated model of firm behavior to estimate the elasticity of
investment with respect to the user cost of capital.
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5.2 Elasticity of investment with respect to its user cost
According to neoclassical theory, a firm maximizes its value by choosing the optimal capital
stock (after optimally choosing variable inputs) that maximizes the stream of after tax profits,
subject to the capital accumulation process equation:
maxVs =
∞∑
s=t
(1− τt)pYt Ft(Kt−1)− pKt C(It,Kt−1)It(1− Γt)
(1 + rt)−(s−t)
,
s.t. Kt = (1− δt)Kt−1 + It, (7)
where, F (·): production function, C(·): capital adjustment cost function, and the rest of the
variables are defined as above.
Auerbach and Hassett (1992) and Auerbach (1989) derive an analytical solution for invest-
ment of a profit maximizing firm under a constant growth trend, multiplicative shocks to the
production function and adjustment costs that are linear in K and I. The solution characterizes
investment as a partial adjustment process toward the desired capital stock, which depends on
current and future expected values of the user cost. The main differences between the deriva-
tion in the aforementioned papers and previous implementations of the partial adjustment model
(like Hall and Jorgenson (1967)) are: first, that the friction is derived endogenously from a for-
mal model with adjustment costs instead of ad-hoc delivery lags; and second, that investment
depends on current and future values of the user cost, instead of past values of this variable.
Equation 8 shows my econometric specification. As in Cummins et al. (1994), I depart from
Auerbach and Hassett (1992) and assume that firms see tax changes as permanent, thus using
only the current value of the cost of capital instead of current and future values. Moreover,
since in many applications I specifically use instrumental variables to control for endogeneity,
the COC variable in my specifications has the current value of both tax and non-tax variables
(and not a combination of current tax values and lagged values of non-tax variables like the
model in Cummins et al. (1994)).
Following the literature on investment equations, I present results both with and without the
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inclusion of the cash flow to capital ratio. Even if a positive and significant coefficient on this
term should not be interpreted as a sign of financial constraints (Kaplan and Zingales (1999)),
it has proven to have explanatory power for investment.
Iit
Kit−1
= αi + βCOCit + γ
CFit
Kit−1
+ ηt + ²it, (8)
where, CF : cash flow and the rest of the variables are defined as above.
The top panel of Table 4 shows the results of estimating Equation 8 by OLS including plant
and year fixed effects. The first two columns use the full sample period 1994-2002, while the
next columns exclude the Tequila Crisis period. The standard errors are clustered at the “4-digit
industry × region (3MMA or OAD)” level, since this is the level at which the COC variable is
constructed.
Across all specifications, Hausman (1978) tests reject the hypothesis that fixed and random
effects (not reported) coefficients are not systematically different, implying that random effect
models are inconsistent. The results excluding the Tequila Crisis show a negative and significant
relationship between the investment rate and the user cost. The results are robust to the
inclusion or exclusion of the cash flow variable.
The elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost is derived from multiplying the
coefficient β by the ratio of the means of the COC and I/K variables. The last row of the
top panel displays these elasticities. Excluding the Tequila Crisis the elasticity lies around −1.5
for 1996-2002 and −1.6 for 1997-2002, considerably larger than those found for the US (with a
similar methodology Cummins et al. (1994) found an elasticity of -0.6 for US firms).
To see the extent to which classical errors-in-variables or measurement error might be present,
the bottom panel of Table 4 estimates the same Equation 8 by first differences (with the same
clustering), instead of fixed effects. The two estimators have the same probability limit under
the assumption that there are no errors-in-variables, and should only differ due to sampling
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error.21 Classical errors-in-variables should bias the first differences estimator toward zero. The
two estimators systematically differ when using the full 1994-2002 sample, but do not differ
when I exclude the Tequila Crisis. The logic of this result is clear given two facts: First, the
dramatic increase and volatility of interest rates during the crisis (Table 1) might introduce
measurement error in the user cost. Second, from 1995 to 1996, changes in investment and
changes in the user cost might present legislative endogeneity, i.e., the fact that policy makers
tend to introduce investment incentives when investment is perceived to be “low” (as mentioned
in Section 3.2, in 1996 the government increased the value of depreciation allowances trying to
promote investment in the aftermath of the crisis).
5.2.1 Logarithmic and industry aggregate regressions
The fact that the elasticity is the product of the estimated coefficient and the ratio of the means
of the user cost and the investment rate variables implies that a greater than unity elasticity
might be an artifact of the ratio of the means (because of fat tails) and not really an effect of
the coefficient. A valid solution to this problem would be to estimate the model in logarithms,
since the coefficient then would be interpreted directly as the elasticity.
In this case, however, this basic approach can be misleading because the many zeros in the
investment rate variable are replaced by missing values when taking logs. Moreover, Tobit panel
models are inconsistent since they can only be estimated through random effects.22 I address
this issue by aggregating information to the “6-digit industry × region” level (in order to get
rid of many of the zeros) and then run the model in logs. For these regressions, I cluster the
standard errors at the 4-digit industry level.
The top panel of Table 5 displays both the results of the regressions in levels and logs at the
plant level. Note that when taking logarithms 30% of observations are lost. The elasticity from
the model in logs is less than that found in levels. This result was expected since, as shown in
21I also estimate cross sectional IV regressions as in Hausman and Griliches (1986). These regressions support
the results of the analysis presented in Table 7, which uses a subset (only first differences) of these equations.
22As mentioned before, Hausman (1978) Tests reject the null that fixed and random effects models are not
systematically different. Since under the null both models are consistent but under the alternative only the fixed
effects model is, this is evidence that the random effects model is inconsistent.
18
Section 6.3 investment is lumpy (many periods of inactivity are followed by large adjustments),
thus the lost observations can provide a lot of power to explain the large elasticities because
they represent the extensive margin of the elasticity. The elasticity is still higher than unity and
double the size of the US benchmark (which is calculated in levels).
At the aggregate 6-digit industry level only 6% of observations are lost when taking logs.
The most important result from these regressions is that the elasticity is unaffected by the use of
levels or logarithms. Regardless of the model, this elasticity is close to −1.3. Although smaller
than the elasticity at the plant level, this number is still greater than unity, and more than
double the size of the US benchmark. This table provides evidence that the large elasticity
found in Table 4 is not an artifact of the ratio of the means.
5.3 Instrumental variables estimation
To make the estimation robust to endogenous determination of the user cost and investment rates
(a common shock might affect interest rates and investment rates), I estimate three different
models with instrumental variables. For the first set of IV regressions, I instrument the user cost
with its lagged value together with current values of tax variables.23 Specifically, the instruments
in this regression are the first lag of the cost of capital and the current value of depreciation
allowances (z).24 The results of this estimation are shown in the top panel of Table 6.
The estimated elasticities for 1996-2002 and 1997-2002 differ in their magnitude. While
estimations for 1994-2002 and 1996-2002 show elasticities around −1.8, this figure is around
−2.5 for 1997-2002. Note also that when I exclude the Tequila Crisis, Hausman (1978) tests
(performed on exactly the same sample) do not reject the hypothesis that the difference between
the OLS and the IV coefficients is not systematically different. The two estimators have the same
probability limit under the null hypothesis that the right hand side variables are exogenous.
Using z might still introduce some endogeneity since the discount rate to get the PDV of
depreciation allowances in the 3MMA region depends on the current interest rate (only its
23This is a common approach in the literature; see Hassett and Hubbard (2002).
24In other specifications where the cash flow to capital ratio is included (not reported), I also included this
variable as endogenous and used its lag as an additional instrument. The results look similar to Table 6, however,
the results for 1997-2002 are only marginally significant.
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riskless component). That is not true for OAD regions, where z is independent of the current
interest rate. For this reason, the bottom panel shows the second IV strategy where instead of
using z as an instrument, I use a dummy for plants that qualify for the optional accelerated
depreciation in the years in which the system was in effect (i.e., the interaction between a dummy
for the OAD region times a dummy for years 1994-1998 and 2002). Using the “reform×region”
dummy potentially eliminates the source of simultaneity of interest rates. The table shows that
the results from this exercise are similar to those using z as the instrument. Note also that
overidentification tests strongly reject the null, and the significance levels of these tests are
greater by an order of magnitude compared to the top panel (as would be expected given the
possible small endogeneity of z). In summary, Table 6 provides evidence of a strong response of
investment to the user cost, and in particular to tax incentives, with a preferred IV estimate of
−2.0 (columns (3) and (4) in the bottom panel).
Even if the exclusion restriction for the use of z or the “region×reform” dummy as instru-
ments does not hold, the panel nature of the database still allows me to estimate IV models
using lagged levels of the right hand variable in models estimated in differences. Hausman and
Griliches (1986) show that there can be many equations to estimate (first differences, second
differences, etc.) with all non-coincident levels as instruments (or levels one or more periods
apart depending on the assumptions about the serial correlation of measurement error).
Table 7 shows the estimation in first differences (in order to get rid of the unobservable plant
effects), using non coincident lagged levels of the user cost as instruments. I estimate the model
with the Generalized Method of Moments Dynamic Panel estimator developed by Arellano and
Bond (1991), including one lag of the left hand side variable as another explanatory variable.
The estimates of this model also show a negative and significant relationship between the user
cost and investment, though the elasticities are less precisely estimated (between−1.0 and −2.0).
Overall, Tables 6 and 7 show that the results of Section 5.2 are robust to IV strategies and
that the elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost is large compared to US standards,
with a preferred IV estimate around −2.0.
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5.4 Long run elasticity of the capital stock with respect to its user cost
The previous section describes the instantaneous reaction of investment to changes in the user
cost. In this section, I also provide estimates of the long run elasticity of the stock of capital to
changes in the user cost. For this purpose, I rely on delivery lags as in Chirinko et al. (1999). The
specification consists of regressing the investment rate on present and lagged percentage changes
of the user cost (∆COC/COC), present and lagged percentage changes of output (∆Y/Y ), and
present and lagged levels of the cash flow to capital ratio (CF/K):
Iit
Kit−1
= αi +
4∑
k=0
βk(
∆COCit−k
COCit−k−1
) +
4∑
k=0
γk(
∆Yit−k
Yit−k−1
)
+
4∑
k=0
ψk(
CFit−k
Kit−k−1
) + ηt + ²it. (9)
where, Y: output, and the rest of the variables are defined as above.
Chirinko et al. (1999) show that, under certain assumptions, the sum of the coefficients
on the lagged changes in the user cost (βk) can be interpreted as the elasticity of the capital
stock with respect to the user cost. Table 8 shows the sums of these coefficients along with
their clustered standard errors using plant and year fixed effects. The last two columns use the
Dynamic Model estimator (Arellano and Bond (1991)), which includes one lag of the dependent
variable, and use levels of the left and right hand side variables as instruments in the regression
in first differences. The average of the elasticities in this table is −1.1.
These results are not inconsistent with the findings of Sections 5.2 and 5.3. In those sections,
my estimates of the elasticity of investment to the user cost were two to four times larger than the
benchmarks for the US reported by Hassett and Hubbard (2002). With a different methodology,
Chirinko et al. (1999) find a long run elasticity of the capital stock around −0.25; I obtain
elasticities that are around four times this benchmark.
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5.5 Long run elasticity of the targeted investment with respect to its user
cost
Finally, I also estimate the long run elasticity of the targeted capital stock or targeted investment
with respect to its user cost. According to the analysis in Caballero et al. (1995), this elasticity
can be estimated under the assumption that deviations between the actual capital stock and
the frictionless capital stock (the one that the firm would choose if there were no adjustment
costs) are not persistent. Since the difference between the frictionless and the actual capital is
a function of the capital output ratio and the user cost in the neoclassical model, the former
assumption suggests estimating a cointegrated regression of the capital output ratio on the user
cost, where the cointegration vector is in fact the long run elasticity of the capital stock with
respect to the user cost:25
ln
(Kit−1
Yit
)
= α+ βCOCit + ²it. (10)
Table 9 shows the results of estimating this model (clustering standard errors at the plant
level). To compare these results to those for the US (reported in Caballero et al. (1995)), I also
allow for different elasticities (the coefficient β) for each 2-digit industry. In columns (2), (4)
and (6), I also include lagged differences of the cost of capital to control for small sample biases,
as suggested by Caballero (1994). Caballero et al. (1995) report coefficients for the different
industries between 0.0 and −2.0, averaging −1.0. My preferred estimates (1996-2002 controlling
for small sample bias, column (4)) show elasticities ranging from −1.7 to −4.7, with a pooled
COC coefficient of −3.4, three and a half times higher than that for the US, again consistent
with the results of Section 5.2.
6 Explaining the large elasticities: additional results
In this section, I explore additional results that might help to explain the large estimated elas-
ticities found in Section 5. First, in Section 6.1 I consider the role of FDI on investment. The
25See Section 6.3.
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presence of multinational firms, with presumable more outside options for investment, might
explain why investment is so responsive. Section 6.2 also presents indirect evidence on the re-
action of prices to changes in tax incentives. Goolsbee (1998) shows that large price reactions
reduce the response of investment in the US. If prices do not react in Mexico, this might also
help to explain the large elasticities. Then, section 6.3 analyzes whether adjustment costs are
convex. Convex adjustment costs might explain the difference between these large elasticities
and those of the US (where adjustment costs have been found to be nonconvex). Finally, in Sec-
tion 6.4 I explore another possible explanation for the large elasticities: misreporting of capital
expenditures. I look at the elasticities for different types of capital, in particular, investment in
transportation equipment and land, which are potentially more difficult to misreport.
6.1 FDI and Investment Incentives
Table 2 shows that plants owned by multinational firms invest more, have higher cash flow to
output ratios and smaller output to capital ratios. In this section I explore whether the response
to changes in the user cost is also different from that of domestically owned plants.
To perform this exercise, I interact the user cost variable with dummies for the country with
majority ownership for each plant. The results displayed in Table 10 show that US, British,
German and Swiss multinationals reacted more than other multinationals, and also more than
domestic firms. Notably, these countries have the largest ownership concentration among the
sample, as can be seen in Column (4).
The differential response of multinational firms might be due to international taxation rules.
According to the traditional theory of international taxation, there are two main systems to
tax foreign income. The first system is called Territorial Taxation. In this system, profits
that a multinational receives from operations in other countries are exempt from taxation in
the country where the multinational is incorporated. In this system, for example, the profits
generated by a plant owned by a German multinational and located in Mexico are taxed in
Mexico but are exempt from taxation in Germany. Thus in this system, multinational firms face
the same burden of taxation as domestic firms.
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The other main system is called Worldwide Taxation. In this system, profits that a multi-
national receives from operations in other countries are included in a “worldwide” measure of
income, which is the basis for taxes in the country of incorporation. In some cases, the govern-
ment of the country of incorporation allows claiming tax credits on the taxes paid to foreign
governments (with some possible limit). In this system, for example, the profits generated by a
plant owned by a US multinational and located in Mexico are taxed in Mexico and they are also
included as taxable income in the US. However, the multinational firm can claim tax credits to
the Internal Revenue Service in the US for taxes paid to the Mexican government. In this set
up, multinational firms might avoid facing the full burden of taxation in the host country.
Column (2) of Table 10 displays the general method of taxing foreign income in these nine
countries (OECD (1991)). According to this classification, in Column (3) I present results of
regressing the investment rate on interactions of the user cost variable and dummies for the
different taxation systems. The counterintuitive result indicates that the response by multi-
nationals incorporated in countries with territorial systems of taxation is slightly lower than
those incorporated in countries with worldwide systems of taxation. However, a linear test of
the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal is unable to reject the null. Once transformed to
elasticities, the difference is even smaller. This finding implies that the reason behind the higher
response of multinational firms does not rely on international taxation issues, but probably on
more available options for investment.
The analysis of this subsection shows that the response of multinational firms is larger than
that of domestically owned plants, which, together with the plausible assumption that multi-
national firms have more outside options for investment, partially explains the large elasticities
found in Section 5.
6.2 Price response to changes in tax incentives
As noted in the literature review, there is evidence that prices react to changes in tax incentives,
reducing its effect on investment. Thus, the large elasticities found in this paper might be due to
price insensitiveness. To see if that is the case, I run separate regressions for capital expenditures
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in the domestic market and imports of capital goods.26 Under perfect markets for international
and domestic capital goods and no other imperfections in the financial markets, the elasticities
of both imports and domestic purchases should be about the same. Moreover, the reforms to
the Mexican tax system are unlikely to change the international prices of capital goods but, if
the domestic capital goods market is not perfect, domestic prices might change. In that case
the estimated elasticity of imports would be higher than that of domestically purchased assets.
Table 11 shows the results of these regressions.27 The elasticity of imported investment
triples that of domestically purchased capital goods (−0.9 versus −3.1). This table thus presents
evidence of a possible domestic price response to changes in tax incentives. This finding suggests
that the openness of the Mexican economy and its proximity to the US market of capital goods
might explain the large elasticities, since prices in the international capital goods are fixed.
6.3 Nonparametric analysis of the adjustment cost function
The use of plant level data allows me to perform a detailed analysis of the investment process,
in order to determine the nature of adjustment costs. The presence of convex adjustment costs
could explain the large elasticities found in this paper, compared to nonconvex adjustment costs
as those found for the US. For this purpose, I construct a measure of the desired capital stock,
following Caballero et al. (1995), by first imputing the frictionless capital stock to each firm,
using Equation 11 (the former is the capital stock that the firm would choose if adjustment costs
were temporarily removed, while the latter is the capital stock that the firm chooses when there
are no adjustment costs at all).
ln(K∗it)− ln(Kit−1) = ηit
(
ln(Yit)− ln(Kit−1)− θiCOCit
)
, (11)
where, K∗: frictionless capital (before adjustments take place).
To obtain K∗, some parameters need to be estimated. As in Caballero et al. (1995), θi is
taken to be equal to the coefficient of the cointegrated regression in Table 9 (Column (4)); this is
26The results are the same if the model is estimated as a Seemingly Unrelated Equations Model (SUR).
27The user cost for imports of assets is adjusted for changes in the foreign exchange rate.
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because deviations between actual and frictionless capital stock are assumed not to be persistent,
which implies that there is a long run relationship between the variables in the right hand side
of the equation that can be estimated by cointegration. The value for ηit is approximated as the
cost share of machinery and equipment for each 2-digit industry, with data for input costs from
the EIA.28
Once the frictionless stock of capital (K∗) has been determined, the desired capital stock
(Kd) is assumed to be proportional to the frictionless capital, up to a plant specific constant.
This constant is estimated as the average difference between the actual capital and the frictionless
capital for the five observations in which the investment rate is closest to the median investment
rate:
ln(Kdit) = ln(K
∗
it−1)− di, (12)
where, di: plant specific constant.
With a measure of the desired capital stock at hand, it is then easy to explore the nature of
adjustment costs. For example, I can analyze mandated investment (i.e., the investment that
is necessary to close the gap between the actual capital stock and the desired capital stock).
Furthermore, I can also explore the pattern of the average adjustment function (i.e., the ratio
of actual investment to mandated investment).
Figure 1 shows histograms for the actual investment rate, the estimated shock and the
mandated investment rate. Following Caballero et al. (1995) I standardize these measures by
removing plant means and dividing by plant standard deviations. Note how actual investment
is more skewed (thicker right tail) and has higher kurtosis (spike) than mandated investment.
Mandated investment even displays negative excess kurtosis. This pattern is consistent with the
presence of irreversibilities and nonconvexities in the capital accumulation process.
Using nonparametric estimation, I also show the relationship between investment and man-
dated investment in the top panel of Figure 2. Irreversibilities are evidenced by the small
response of actual investment to negative mandated investment, i.e., resilience to disinvest. At
28Appendix B of Caballero et al. (1995) shows the details in the derivation of this approximation.
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large negative levels of mandated investment, actual investment is in fact flat. Moreover, con-
sistent with nonconvex adjustment costs, the slope of the line in the positive side of mandated
investment is increasing. Under convex adjustment costs, large investment episodes should be
avoided and replaced by small and gradual adjustments. Nonconvex adjustment costs provide
a rationale for higher proportional investment responses to higher mandated investment.
Further evidence can be derived from nonparametric estimation of the average adjustment
function, which is shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2. Once again, note that the left hand
side of the figure is almost flat, confirming that investment is irreversible: negative mandated
investments are in general not followed by negative adjustments to the capital stock. The
smoother line shows an S-pattern, as found by Caballero et al. (1995) for US plants. As noted
in Section 2.2, my results contrast with those of Gelos and Isgut (2001b). These authors find
irreversible but convex adjustment costs. The differences could be due to the different time
period of study or the use of different capital stock and user cost variables, as noted in Section
4 and the Appendix A.29
The evidence presented in this section rejects that adjustment costs are convex. In fact, the
adjustment cost function resembles that for US manufacturing plants. Therefore, the explanation
for elasticities larger than those of the US does not lie on convex adjustment costs.
6.4 Investment in other types of capital
The previous analysis considers only investment in machinery and equipment. One possible
explanation for the large estimated elasticities can be that firms misreport capital expenditures.
For example, in response to the 1999 reform, which increased the user cost for many plants,
managers could have tried to report some capital expenditures as operating expenses (tax eva-
sion). The likelihood that this might contaminate information on the EIA is small for two
reasons. First, firms are not liable for tax purposes regarding the information reported on the
survey. Second, in the validation process INEGI officials match investment information (flow of
29Gelos and Isgut (2001b) study 1984-1994. Also, they do not construct a measure of the cost of capital, but
only use the relative prices of capital and output. Moreover, they use gross book value to measure the initial
capital stock in their perpetual inventory method, while I was able to use the initial market value of assets from
the 1994 Industrial Census.
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purchases of capital goods) to asset values (balance sheet), reducing the misreporting.
Even though the possibility of misreporting is low, I analyze the behavior of other types of
capital to provide further evidence on a generalized response of investment to changes in the
user cost. These other asset categories are: constructions and facilities, land and transportation
equipment. It is important to note, however, that the tax depreciation rules for these other types
of capital do not vary by industry, which in turn reduces the variation in the COC variable and
might decrease the precision with which the coefficients of the regressions are estimated.
Table 12 shows the results of these regressions. In these regressions the unit of observation
is each asset category in each plant, thus each regression includes “plant × asset” fixed effects. I
cluster the standard errors in these regressions at the “4-digit industry × region × asset” level.
The first two columns show the results of pooling all types of capital together. The number of
observations is not just the product of the number of plants times the number of periods times
four since many plants present missing values for investment in these other types of capital.
The results show an elasticity even higher than that of Table 4. This might be due to larger
elasticities for some asset classes than for machinery and equipment. Columns (3) and (4) show
the coefficients separated by asset categories.
Note that all coefficients are negative and significant. The largest coefficient corresponds to
transportation equipment. Land also presents a coefficient larger than that of machinery and
equipment. Constructions and facilities has a coefficient smaller than machinery and equipment,
but also negative and highly significant.
Since land, constructions and transportation equipment are harder to misreport for tax
evasion, I conclude that the large elasticity found in Section 5 is not an artifact of tax evasion
practices.
7 Policy implications
Worldwide tax policy discussions rarely omit the debate of the efficiency advantages of consump-
tion taxes versus income taxes. Since most countries have in fact hybrid systems, tax reform
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discussions are overwhelmingly related to the optimal choice of instruments to gradually move to
consumption taxes. The implications for tax policy of a large response of investment to changes
in the user of cost, as the one found in this paper, are presumably important in this setting.
The results of this paper imply that fiscal policies designed to change the corporate tax
rate, investment tax credits and depreciation allowances are effective in promoting investment.
Moreover, the user cost not only varies due to changes in taxes, but also with changes in interest
rates. The results of Sections 5 and 6 also imply that monetary policies aimed to change interest
rates can have important consequences on manufacturing investment.
The validity of using these elasticities for tax policy analysis lies on the “structural” nature
of the model from which they are derived. The specifications are robust to the inclusion of year
fixed effects and, in many cases, linear tests (not reported) were unable to reject the null that
the coefficients of the year effects are equal. Overall, this mitigates the possible critique that
the estimated coefficients should not be used for policy implications.30
In this section, I discuss the magnitude of these responses. First, I predict the effect that the
tax provisions for 2003, 2004 and 2005 can have on manufacturing investment in Mexico,31 based
on the estimated elasticities. Then, I compare these results with the hypothetical introduction of
a 10% Investment Tax Credit (ITC) in 2003 (together with the elimination of the OAD system).
Finally, I estimate the impact of allowing full expensing of investment for all plants in 2003.
Table 13 presents the calibrations of these scenarios. Each row represents the period of
analysis: either for the actual reforms approved by the Congress or for the ITC and full expensing
scenarios. The first two columns show the weighted average level and percentage change in the
user cost (weighted by the capital stock), respectively. The last two columns show the predicted
level of the investment rate: Column (3) under the assumption of a conservative elasticity of
−1.5 (OLS) and Column (4) under the assumption of my preferred IV estimated elasticity of
−2.0.
In the top panel, the initial level of the investment rate is taken to be equal to the actual
30See Lucas (1976).
31The reforms include the reduction in the discount rate to calculate OAD to 3%, and the reduction of the
corporate tax rate. See Section 3.2.
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weighted (by capital stock) level of the investment rate in 2002 (around 9.0%). This very small
investment rate might bias the policy results downwards. To get the level of investment in each
year, I make calculations at the 4-digit industry level.32 The predicted investment rates for
2005, under the approved reforms, are between 11.2% and 12.0%. The introduction of a 10%
investment tax credit (repealing the OAD system) is predicted to increase investment rates to
12.4%-13.5% and full expensing to 12.7%-13.9%. Notably, the approved changes are nontrivial
when compared to the ITC and full expensing scenarios, and are predicted to have an important
effect on investment.
Assuming a level of the investment rate equal to the average for the period 1994-2002 (16.3%),
the predicted changes are considerably larger in absolute value. The cumulative effect of the
approved reforms gives a weighted average investment rate in 2005 of 20.3%-21.6%. A 10%
ITC (repealing the OAD system) would have increased the weighted average investment rate to
22.3%-24.3%, compared to 22.9-25.2% in the full expensing scenario.
8 Conclusions
This paper provides additional evidence on the responsiveness of investment to changes in the
user cost of capital. I use a panel database of Mexican manufacturing plants and take advantage
of the large variation in the user cost provided by recent reforms to the Mexican corporate tax
system in order to identify the elasticity of investment with respect to its user cost.
The results of this paper show that the elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost
is larger than unity, with a preferred estimate of −2.0, implying that taxes affect investment
decisions. These results are robust to different specifications, including estimating models of long
run and short run investment dynamics. The results are also robust to different IV strategies,
including instrumenting the user cost with current tax parameters or dummies for the reforms
and the use of dynamic panel IV models.
Additional results show that the small open economy nature of the Mexican economy might
32Specifically, I multiply the investment rate in 2002 for each industry by one plus the product of the assumed
elasticity and the change in the user cost for that industry. I obtain an aggregate measure by weighting industry
investment rates using the capital stock in 2002.
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explain the large elasticities. In particular, I show that plants owned by multinational firms
respond more to changes in the user cost. Moreover, I show that even if domestic prices of
capital goods reacted to changes in tax incentives, the openness of the Mexican economy and its
proximity to the US market allow plants to adjust their imports of capital goods and respond to
changes in the user cost. I also show that the pattern of investment is consistent with the presence
of nonconvex adjustment costs, including irreversibilites, similar to those of US manufacturing
plants. This implies that large investment responses are not explained by smoother adjustment
processes compared to US firms. Finally, I present some evidence that the large elasticities are
not the result of misreporting or tax evasion, since the elasticities of investment in transportation
equipment and land (harder to misreport) are also high.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Plant Level Data: EIA, 1994-2002
The Annual Industrial Survey (Encuesta Industrial Annual, or EIA) is conducted by the Mexican
Statistical Agency, INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica, Geograf´ıa e Informa´tica), and is
housed at its headquarters in Aguascalientes, Mexico. It began in 1963 and has been significantly
improved over the years, increasing the sample size, industry representativity and improving the
questionnaire. In this study I use the most recent panel: 1994-2002. I also combine this panel
with aggregate information from the previous panel (1984-1994), as explained below in Section
A.2. INEGI follows a non-random sampling procedure to determine the group of manufacturing
plants that would be surveyed. This procedure, described in INEGI (2005), is based on the
directory of plants of the XIV Industrial Census of 1994 and consists on the following steps:
1. Select the industries, among the 309 6-digit industries in the Mexican Classification System
(CMAP), that contribute the most to total output.33
2. Select the plants with the largest output in each 6-digit industry, until each industry has
at least 80% of total output.
3. Include all plants with more than 100 employees that were not selected by the previous
criteria.
4. Include all plants in industries where production is highly concentrated.
5. Conversely, in industries where production is highly disaggregated, set the maximum num-
ber of selected plants to 100.
The result from this procedure is a sample of 7,171 manufacturing plants in 205 6-digit
industries, which excludes maquiladoras, basic petrochemical plants, refineries and also micro-
industry plants (plants with less than 15 employees). INEGI includes a small random sample of
new plants each year; other plants are reclassified as necessary.
The variables used in the empirical analysis include:34
· Location: state and municipality.
· Industry: 9 (2-digit) “subsectores”, 50 (4-digit) “ramas” and 205 (6-digit) “clases”.
· Employment: total payroll.
· Profit Sharing: total payments to employees and workers due to the profit sharing scheme.
The Mexican Constitution mandates firms to distribute 10% of pre-tax earnings to employ-
ees and workers each fiscal year. The figures in the EIA include actual payments during
the year, regardless of its fiscal year.
· Output: value of production.
· Assets: The next set of variables, broken down for each of these five asset categories: Ma-
33The CMAP (Clasificacio´n Mexicana de Actividades y Productos) is compatible with the International Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (ISIC) at the 4-digit level. The classification consist of the following categories:
1-digit sectores (e.g. Manufacturing, 3); 2-digit subsectores (e.g. Food products, beverages and tobacco, 31);
4-digit ramas (e.g. Dairy products, 3112); and 6-digit clases (e.g. Processing, bottling and packing of milk,
311201).
34The following variable definitions are based on INEGI (2005).
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chinery and equipment;35 constructions and facilities;36 land; transportation equipment;37
and, other assets.38
– Value of assets: the valuation is made at acquisition (historic) cost, defined as the pur-
chasing price plus transportation and installation costs and import duties; excludes
interest.
– Acquisition of new assets: includes the value of each fixed asset purchased and/or
acquired through financial lease or received from other plants of the same firm during
the year of study. Also includes expenses that improved currently used assets by
increasing its useful life by more than one year, changing its nature or increasing its
productivity. Information is broken down by whether the asset was bought in the
domestic (new or used) market, or if it was directly imported from abroad.
– Production of assets for plant own use: includes the value of all fixed assets produced
by the plant for its own use, using plant materials and personnel. The valuation is
done at market prices.
– Sale of assets: is the amount effectively received for the sale of fixed assets owned
by the plant during the year (excluding interest), regardless of whether they were
originally bought from third parties or produced by the plant for own use.
– Depreciation of assets: means the consumption of fixed capital or reduction in the
value of fixed assets used in production during the year, due to physical damage or
obsolescence.
– Write-off of assets: includes the value of all assets retired, scrapped or destroyed due
to its inoperative status. This value is reported at historic costs and thus cannot be
used in the calculation of retirements.39
A.2 Industry aggregate EIA Data, 1984-1994
Industry aggregate information on asset values and depreciation (both at historic prices) was also
used (at the 6-digit level). This information was averaged over the years to estimate industry
economic depreciation rates. This rates were used in the calculation of the cost of capital at the
4-digit level in the 1994-2002 panel of plant level information.
A.3 XIV Industrial Census of 1994
INEGI officials allowed to merge EIA data with information for total assets at market prices
(also called replacement costs) from the 1994 Industrial Census for a subsample of 4,997 plants.40
35Includes mechanic, electric and any other type of machinery and equipment, dies, molds, tools and laboratory
equipment.
36Includes plants, warehouses, offices, stores, parking slots and facilities for water, electricity and steam con-
duction.
37Includes all automotive vehicles, ships, planes, carts, carriages, tractors and freight elevators.
38Includes office equipment and furniture, computers, original software and calculators; excludes intangible
assets like patents.
39Given its inoperative status, the market value of these assets must be near zero, otherwise they could be sold
to generate positive cash flow. In fact, the value is equal to zero at the following percentiles: machinery and
equipment (76), constructions and facilities (95), land (97), transportation equipment (63), and other assets (78).
40The survey guidelines explain what the respondent should understand by replacement cost or market value.
It is the sum of the acquisition cost, plus the value of all improvements and renovations, as well as the revaluation
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The information was also separated by machinery and equipment, constructions and facilities,
land, transportation equipment, and other assets.
A.4 1994 ENESTYC
In 1994, the EIA was jointly surveyed with a Technology Database (Encuesta Nacional de
Empleo, Salarios, Tecnolog´ıa y Capacitacio´n). INEGI officials provided matched information
regarding country of equity ownership for each plant for a subsample of 6,845 plants. The ques-
tionnaire asked the ownership percentage for the following countries: Mexico, USA, Germany,
Canada, France, Netherlands, Japan, UK, and Switzerland.
A.5 Construction of the OAD dummy: Region variable
Due to confidentiality reasons, officials at INEGI directly constructed the variable for whether
a plant qualified for OAD. The Income Tax Law expressly states that, to qualify for this pref-
erential tax treatment of investment, the investment must be made outside the three main
metropolitan areas or 3MMA (Mexico City, Monterrey and Guadalajara).41
According to the tax authority, these jurisdictions are delimited at the municipal level.42 I
provided INEGI with the list of municipalities and they matched a dummy variable for whether
the plant was in the 3MMA region, or if it was located elsewhere, and thus qualified for OAD.
A.6 Construction of capital stock variable
The EIA asks plants to report asset values and depreciation at historic cost. It also includes
questions about the inflation adjustment of both values and depreciation (in order to have an
estimate of the asset value at replacement costs). However, the information for these adjustments
has never been used by the INEGI due to important failures to comply with validation of
the data. Previous studies that have used the EIA create the capital stock series using the
perpetual inventory method.43 However, the perpetual inventory method can only generate
reliable estimates if the panel is considerable long (many time periods) to erode the bias created
by using book values of assets, instead of market values of assets, as the initial capital stock.
Moreover, the distinction between information at gross book value (also called historic cost)
and information at net book value (also called Book Value) has been often ignored. The gross
due to inflation, less the accumulated depreciation, i.e., the value of all allowances due to physical damage and
obsolesce.
41There exist other considerations that allow for this special tax treatment. For example, even if a plant is
located inside the 3MMA the investment can still qualify for OAD if the plant in question and the technology
implemented are both labor intensive.
42According to the Decree to reform the Income Tax Law. (Diario Oficial de la Federacio´n, December 12th,
2004): The MA of Mexico City includes all jurisdictions of the D.F. and the following municipalities of the State
of Me´xico: Atizapa´n de Zaragoza, Cuautitla´n, Cuautitla´n Izcalli, Chalco, Ecatepec de Morelos, Huixquilucan,
Juchitepec, La Paz, Naucalpan de Jua´rez, Nezahualco´yotl, Ocoyoacac, Tenango del Aire, Tlalnepantla de Baz,
Tultitla´n, Valle de Chalco-Solidaridad and Xalatlaco. Guadalajara MA includes the following municipalities of the
State of Jalisco: Guadalajara, Tlaquepaque, Tonala´ and Zapopan. The MA of Monterrey includes the following
municipalities in the State of Nuevo Leo´n: Monterrey, Cadereyta Jime´nez, San Nicola´s de los Garza, Apodaca,
Guadalupe, San Pedro Garza Garc´ıa, Santa Catarina, General Escobedo, Garc´ıa and Jua´rez.
43For example, Verhoogen (2004), Gelos and Isgut (2001a,b), Gelos and Werner (1999), Lo´pez-Co´rdova and
Mesquita-Moreira (2003), Herna´ndez-Laos and del Valle-Rivera (2000), Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2005).
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book value is the actual payment made at the time of purchase, without any adjustment (neither
for inflation, nor depreciation). The net book value is equal to the purchase payments minus
the value of depreciation allowances, but without inflation adjustments.
The information for asset values in the EIA is reported at gross book value or historic cost
(no adjustment for depreciation), and thus if used as the initial capital stock in the perpetual
inventory method induces a bias, since the stock can still include assets for which depreciation
has reduced their value.
I overcome this problem by merging the data of the EIA with data from the XIV Industrial
Census of 1994. In the census, the information for asset values is reported at market (replace-
ment) values. That means that I can actually use the perpetual inventory method with the
information of the EIA, but having as the initial capital stock a true market valuation of the
assets in each plant.
Another common assumption of previous studies that use the EIA is to assume a fixed
depreciation rate for different asset categories. However, since the capital stock is one of the
most important variables in my analysis, this simplification can be very costly in terms of
measurement error.
I take advantage of the fact that both asset prices and depreciation are reported in the EIA
at historic cost. Thus, for each asset category in each year I created a plant specific depreciation
rate by dividing the reported depreciation by the value of assets. Since the value of assets has
not been adjusted for any depreciation nor inflation, and depreciation has not been adjusted for
inflation, this depreciation rate is quite precise.
The actual computation for the capital stock is described in Equation A.1. Finally, before
using any of the actual figures in the survey, all quantities were transformed to 2002 pesos
using the average (annual) Producer Price Index for Investment in Fixed Assets, published by
Banco de Me´xico. In the next equation, j defines each type of asset (machinery and equipment,
constructions and facilities, land, transportation equipment and other assets), i defines each
manufacturing plant, and t defines each year from 1994 to 2002.
Kjit = MVAjit, t = 1994,
Kjit = (1− δjit)Kjit−1 + Ijit, t = 1995, ..., 2002, (A.1)
where K is the capital stock; MVA is the market value of assets (from the Industrial Census);
I is investment (including retirements; its construction is explained in Section A.7); and δ is the
depreciation rate (defined in equation A.2):
δjit =
Djit
Ajit−1
, (A.2)
where, D is the total depreciation (at historic cost) and A is the historic cost value of the asset.
Finally, whenever equation A.1 generated a negative capital stock, that year K was set to
zero, and continue the same recursion.
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A.7 Construction of expenditures, investment and retirement variables
The following expenditure, investment and retirement variables are used in the empirical analy-
sis:
GEjit = newjit + usedjit + importjit + ownusejit, (A.3)
where, GE is gross expenditures, new is acquisition of domestic new assets; used is acquisition
of domestic used assets; imports imports of assets; and ownuse the value of assets produced by
the plant for its own use.
NEjit = GEjit − δjitKjit, (A.4)
where, NE is net expenditures.
Rjit = assetsalesjit (A.5)
where, R is the value of retirements, assetsales is the value of the sale of assets.
Ijit = GEjit −Rjit, (A.6)
where, I is investment.
A.8 Construction of cash flow variable
Unfortunately, the data on EIA is available only at the manufacturing plant level, and cannot be
properly aggregated at the firm level. Financial information is thus not available, and a measure
of cash flow is absent in the questionnaire. However, since the profit sharing rate is calculated at
the firm level, the reported profit sharing amount contains information on firm pre-tax income.
I thus follow Gelos and Werner (1999) in multiplying the reported profit sharing by 10 to get
an estimate of pre-tax cash flow.
A.9 Construction of cost of capital variable
The cost of capital variable was created using Income Tax Laws (Ley del Impuesto Sobre la
Renta) for the years of study, and was assigned to each plant according to whether the Accel-
erated Depreciation Option was applicable. It was calculated separately for each of the asset
categories and assigned to each plant at the 4-digit industry level. The exact procedure is
outlined below.
1. Each plant was classified as located in one of two zones: 3MMA-region if inside one of the
three major metropolitan areas where OAD was not allowed, and OAD-region, otherwise.
2. The cost of capital for each asset category in each plant and year was calculated using
Equation 2. The inputs for this calculation come from the following sources. Table 1 shows
the behavior of some of these parameters.
· The capital-output price ratio was created using two sources: The numerator is the
output deflator for each 2-digit industry from the Mexican National Income and
Product Accounts. The denominator is the price index for fixed capital formation,
as reported by Banco de Me´xico. The ratio was set equal to 1 in 2002.
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· The Corporate Tax Rate was directly obtained from the Income Tax Laws for various
years, and was adjusted to include the burden of the profit sharing rate.44
· The required rate of return was assumed equal to the real riskless interest rate (UDI-
BONOS),45 plus a time varying risk premium equal to the difference between the
short term interest rate on private commercial paper and the short term interest rate
on government bonds (CETES).
· The present value of depreciation allowances for each plant was calculated based on
Equation 1 using the normal depreciation rates allowed for each type of asset in the
Income Tax Law for plants in the 3MMA region. For plants in the OAD region, it
was calculated using the maximum optional accelerated depreciation allowed. This
procedure implicitly assumes that all plants that qualify for OAD actually choose
this option. Table A-1 shows the depreciation rates for selected assets and industries
applicable in 2002.
· Economic depreciation rates were estimated at the 6-digit industry level using ag-
gregate information about asset values and depreciation (both at historic cost) from
the previous EIA panel (1984-1994). These depreciation rates were assigned at the
4-digit industry codes to each plant in the EIA panel used in the study (1994-2002).
A.10 Treatment of extreme and missing values
Variables were winsorized at the 1% and 99% of the empirical distribution. Observations for
which the capital stock was zero were eliminated. Plants with incomplete information were not
included in the analysis, thus the panel is balanced.
Tables and Figures
44An alternative Asset Tax was enacted in 1989 to prevent firms from tax evasion. This tax is totally deductible
from the Corporate Income Tax, and thus functions as a minimum tax. This paper does not consider the impact
this provision might have on investment rates.
45UDIBONOS are government bonds issued at a fixed real interest rate for 3, 5 and 10 years. They started in
1996; the rate for 1994 and 1995 was extrapolated using other nominal interest rates on government bonds.
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Table 1: Corporate Tax Rates and Depreciation Allowances, 1993-2007
Year Corporate Tax Rate* OAD system** Real interest rate***
1993 35% Yes (5%) 10.83%
1994 34% Yes (5%) 12.89%
1995 34% Yes (5%) 18.72%
1996 34% Yes (3%) 12.78%
1997 34% Yes (3%) 8.67%
1998 34% Yes (3%) 8.51%
1999 35% No 10.29%
2000 35% No 8.67%
2001 35% No 8.12%
2002 35% Yes (6%, w/deferral) 6.64%
2003 34% Yes (3%, w/deferral) 5.38%
2004 33% Yes (3%, w/deferral) 5.41%
2005 30% Yes (3%) 5.74%
2006 29% Yes (3%) 5.74%
2007 28% Yes (3%) 5.74%
Example of tax parameters: Automobile parts industry
z ETR COC
Region 3MMA OAD 3MMA OAD 3MMA OAD
1994 0.617 0.730 0.361 0.284 0.263 0.245
1995 0.608 0.730 0.330 0.253 0.259 0.240
1996 0.617 0.824 0.361 0.207 0.220 0.192
1997 0.672 0.824 0.372 0.242 0.190 0.172
1998 0.651 0.824 0.389 0.244 0.198 0.177
1999 0.616 0.616 0.397 0.397 0.243 0.243
2000 0.650 0.650 0.397 0.397 0.240 0.240
2001 0.663 0.663 0.397 0.397 0.243 0.243
2002 0.669 0.653 0.422 0.444 0.228 0.232
*In 1999-2001, the tax rate on Retained Earnings was 30%. The (5% × Taxable Income) tax liability was paid
upon distribution. **The number in parenthesis is the discount rate applicable to calculate the PDV of
depreciation allowances under the Optional Accelerated Depreciation system. See Section 3 for deferral rules in
2002-2004. ***See Section 4.3 for a description of the calculations. Source: Federal Income Tax Law (Ley del
Impuesto Sobre la Renta) and author’s calculations. z is the present value of future depreciation allowances,
ETR is the effective tax rate and COC is the cost of capital. 3MMA stands for the region including the three
main metropolitan areas. OAD stands for the region outside these metropolitan areas, where the accelerated
depreciation applied.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics, 1994-2002
Mean Std. Dev. 25% 50% 75% N
COC 0.253 0.044 0.226 0.249 0.276 33,678
GE/K 0.168 0.378 0.000 0.032 0.159 33,678
NE/K 0.072 0.359 -0.081 -0.042 0.062 33,655
R/K 0.005 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 33,678
I/K 0.162 0.371 0.000 0.029 0.153 33,678
CF/K 0.623 1.838 0.000 0.043 0.422 32,443
Y/K 25.213 302.202 2.510 5.843 14.426 33,339
3MMA OAD Difference
(Means) 3MMA-OAD Std. Err
COC 0.257 0.249 0.007*** 0.000
GE/K 0.174 0.163 0.010** 0.004
NE/K 0.075 0.068 0.007* 0.004
R/K 0.006 0.005 0.001*** 0.000
I/K 0.166 0.158 0.009** 0.004
CF/K 0.787 0.452 0.335*** 0.020
Y/K 28.989 21.300 7.689** 3.310
Multinationals Domestic Difference
(Means) Mult.-Dom. Std. Err
COC 0.254 0.253 0.001 0.001
GE/K 0.204 0.165 0.039*** 0.007
NE/K 0.103 0.069 0.035*** 0.007
R/K 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000
I/K 0.199 0.158 0.041*** 0.007
CF/K 0.884 0.595 0.289*** 0.035
Y/K 18.363 25.936 -7.574 5.630
COC is the user cost of capital, GE and NE are gross and net capital expenditures, respectively; R are
retirements, I is investment, Y is output, CF is cash flow and K is the capital stock. *,**,*** significant at
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 3MMA stands for the region including the three main metropolitan areas. OAD
stands for the region outside these metropolitan areas, where the accelerated depreciation applied.
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Table 3: Differences-in-Differences regressions
Iit
Kit−1 = αi + β1OAD
period
it + β2OAD
region
it + β3(OAD
period
it ×OADregionit ) + ηt + ²it
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1994-2002 1996-2002 1997-2002
OADperiod 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
OADregion -0.036 -0.01 -0.084** -0.05 -0.063 -0.018
(0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048) (0.048)
OADperiod ×OADregion 0.015* 0.015* 0.014* 0.015* 0.015* 0.016*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 0.158*** 0.123*** 0.182*** 0.143*** 0.171*** 0.127***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 33,678 33,678 26,194 26,194 22,452 22,452
R-squared 0.161 0.17 0.202 0.211 0.224 0.236
Plant FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y N Y N Y
I is investment, K is the capital stock . Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables winsorized at the
1% and 99% of the empirical distribution. *,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 3MMA stands
for the region including the three main metropolitan areas. OAD stands for the region outside these
metropolitan areas, where the accelerated depreciation applied.
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Table 4: Investment response to changes in the user cost
Iit
Kit−1 = αi + βCOCit + γ
CFit
Kit−1 + ηt + ²it
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1994-2002 1996-2002 1997-2002
COC -0.265 -0.255 -1.021*** -0.986*** -1.074*** -1.028***
(0.188) (0.189) (0.260) (0.257) (0.327) (0.325)
CF/K 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.049***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.156*** 0.154*** 0.330*** 0.333*** 0.342*** 0.343***
(0.045) (0.049) (0.062) (0.066) (0.077) (0.083)
Observations 33,678 32,443 26,194 24,959 22,452 21,217
R-squared 0.17 0.193 0.212 0.237 0.237 0.263
Plant FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Elasticity -0.414 -0.398 -1.572 -1.518 -1.682 -1.610
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1994-2002 1996-2002 1997-2002
COC 0.148 0.181 -1.057** -0.941** -0.951** -0.880**
(0.256) (0.250) (0.434) (0.457) (0.428) (0.442)
CF/K 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.055***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 29,936 27,842 22,452 20,358 18,710 16,720
R-squared 0.004 0.029 0.002 0.029 0.001 0.025
Plant FE FD FD FD FD FD FD
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Elasticity 0.231 0.283 -1.627 -1.449 -1.489 -1.378
I is investment, K is the capital stock , COC is the user cost of capital and CF is cash flow. Robust standard
errors in parentheses (clustered at the “4-digit industry × region (3MMA or OAD)” level). FD: Model
estimated in first differences. All variables winsorized at the 1% and 99% of the empirical distribution. *,**,***
significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 3MMA stands for the region including the three main metropolitan
areas. OAD stands for the region outside these metropolitan areas, where the accelerated depreciation applied.
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Table 5: Logarithmic and industry aggregate regressions
ln ( IitKit−1 ) = αi + β ln (COCit) + γ ln (
CFit
Kit−1 ) + ηt + ²it
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Plants: 1996-2002
Levels Logs
COC -1.021*** -0.986*** -1.186*** -1.143**
(0.260) (0.257) (0.430) (0.463)
CF/K 0.049*** 0.273***
(0.005) (0.025)
Constant 0.330*** 0.333*** -4.582*** -4.242***
(0.062) (0.066) (0.607) (0.693)
Observations 26,194 24,959 18,227 11,476
R-squared 0.212 0.237 0.425 0.47
Plant FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Elasticity -1.572 -1.518 -1.186 -1.143
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aggregate (6-digit industry level): 1996-2002
Levels Logs
COC -0.848*** -0.820*** -1.284*** -1.264***
(0.271) (0.267) (0.456) (0.420)
CF/K 0.036** 0.141***
(0.016) (0.033)
Constant 0.357*** 0.331*** -4.993*** -4.606***
(0.059) (0.072) (0.681) (0.628)
Observations 2,667 2,667 2,517 2,363
R-squared 0.291 0.294 0.428 0.445
Industry (6-digit) FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Elasticity -1.303 -1.260 -1.284 -1.264
I is investment, K is the capital stock , COC is the user cost of capital and CF is cash flow. Robust standard
errors in parentheses (clustered at the “4-digit industry × region (3MMA or OAD)” level in the top panel and
at the 4-digit industry level in the bottom panel). In the bottom panel all quantities came from aggregates at
the “6-digit industry × region” level. All variables winsorized at the 1% and 99% of the empirical distribution.
*,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 3MMA stands for the region including the three main
metropolitan areas. OAD stands for the region outside these metropolitan areas, where the accelerated
depreciation applied.
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Table 6: Instrumental variables estimation: investment response to changes in the user cost
Iit
Kit−1 = αi + βCOCit + γ
CFit
Kit−1 + ηt + ²it
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instruments: Lagged COC and current z
1994-2002 1996-2002 1997-2002
COC -1.179*** -1.184*** -1.188*** -1.174*** -1.650*** -1.648***
(0.319) (0.313) (0.426) (0.417) (0.540) (0.521)
CF/K 0.044*** 0.049*** 0.045***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant 0.436*** 0.349*** 0.368*** 0.379*** 0.610*** 0.499***
(0.081) (0.073) (0.100) (0.104) (0.146) (0.131)
Observations 29,936 28,701 22,452 21,217 18,710 17,579
Plant FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Hausman test (OLS) 0.002 0.005 0.998 0.995 0.288 0.391
Overid test 0.141 0.102 0.188 0.259 0.141 0.186
Elasticity -1.841 -1.849 -1.829 -1.807 -2.584 -2.581
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instruments: Lagged COC and (OADperiod ×OADregion)
1994-2002 1996-2002 1997-2002
COC -1.391*** -1.403*** -1.323*** -1.277*** -1.941*** -1.886***
(0.344) (0.341) (0.431) (0.420) (0.555) (0.529)
CF/K 0.044*** 0.049*** 0.045***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant 0.462*** 0.399*** 0.445*** 0.368*** 0.689*** 0.558***
(0.087) (0.080) (0.108) (0.098) (0.150) (0.133)
Observations 29,936 28,701 22,452 21,217 18,710 17,579
Plant FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Hausman test (OLS) 0.000 0.001 0.930 0.973 0.035 0.130
Overid test 0.939 0.681 0.994 0.842 0.654 0.948
Elasticity -2.172 -2.191 -2.037 -1.966 -3.039 -2.953
I is investment, K is the capital stock, COC is the user cost of capital and CF is cash flow. Robust standard
errors in parentheses (clustered at the “4-digit industry × region (3MMA or OAD)” level). All variables
winsorized at the 1% and 99% of the empirical distribution. *,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively. In the bottom panel, instruments are lagged cost of capital and a tax reform dummy (equal to 1 in
years in which the OAD system was in effect, but only for those plants that qualified for this preferential
treatment, i.e., located outside the main three metropolitan areas). 3MMA stands for the region including the
three main metropolitan areas. OAD stands for the region outside these metropolitan areas, where the
accelerated depreciation applied.
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Table 7: Dynamic Panel IV Model: Response of investment to changes in the user cost
( IitKit−1 −
Iit−1
Kit−2 ) = α+ β(COCit − COCit−1) + γ(
CFit
Kit−1 −
CFit−1
Kit−2 ) + ηt + ²it
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1994-2002 1996-2002 1997-2002
COC -0.146 0.095 -0.782*** -0.668** -1.267*** -1.147***
(0.145) (0.165) (0.250) (0.288) (0.296) (0.327)
CF/K 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.050***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant 0.002 -0.005** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.020***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 26,194 24,100 18,710 16,720 14,968 13,084
Plant FE FD FD FD FD FD FD
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 0.507 0.341 0.609 0.701 0.182 0.445
Elasticity -0.228 0.148 -1.204 -1.028 -1.984 -1.796
I is investment, K is the capital stock, COC is the user cost of capital and CF is cash flow. Robust standard
errors in parentheses (clustered at the “4-digit industry × region (3MMA or OAD)” level). FD: Model
estimated in first differences. All variables winsorized at the 1% and 99% of the empirical distribution. *,**,***
significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The model is estimated in first differences using the Arellano-Bond
dynamic panel estimator, including one lag of the dependent variable: the instruments are available lagged levels
of the left and right hand side variables. 3MMA stands for the region including the three main metropolitan
areas. OAD stands for the region outside these metropolitan areas, where the accelerated depreciation applied.
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Table 8: Response of the capital stock to changes in the user cost, 1994-2002
Iit
Kit−1 = αi +
∑4
k=0 βk(
∆COCit−k
COCit−k−1 ) +
∑4
k=0 γk(
∆Yit−k
Yit−k−1 ) +
∑4
k=0 ψk(
CFit−k
Kit−k−1 ) + ηt + ²it
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Dynamic Panel∑
∆COC/COC -0.813* -0.925 -1.065* -1.655**
(0.471) (0.579) (0.586) (0.656)∑
∆Y/Y 0.043 0.024 0.002 -0.043
(0.040) (0.047) (0.036) (0.041)∑
CF/K 0.073*** 0.093***
(0.016) (0.010)
Constant 0.155*** 0.055* -0.006 -0.009
(0.020) (0.030) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 13,882 11,977 10,316 8,508
R-squared 0.332 0.377 na na
Plant FE Y Y FD FD
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Elasticity -0.813 -0.925 -1.065 -1.655
I is investment, K is the capital stock, COC is the user cost of capital, Y is output and CF is cash flow.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the “4-digit industry × region (3MMA or OAD)” level). All
variables winsorized at the 1% and 99% of the empirical distribution. *,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively. In the last two columns, the model is estimated in first differences, using the Arellano-Bond
dynamic panel estimator, including one lag of the dependent variable: the instruments are available lagged levels
of the left and right hand side variables. 3MMA stands for the region including the three main metropolitan
areas. OAD stands for the region outside these metropolitan areas, where the accelerated depreciation applied.
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Table 9: Long run response of the targeted capital stock to changes in the user cost, 1994-2002
ln
(
Kit−1
Yit
)
= α+ βCOCit + ²it
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1994-2002 1996-2002 1997-2002
COC× Industry31 -3.430*** -3.433*** -3.129*** -3.984*** -2.670*** -3.606***
(0.623) (0.811) (0.720) (0.994) (0.782) (1.071)
COC× Industry32 -3.888*** -4.362*** -3.499*** -4.697*** -2.957*** -4.633***
(0.744) (0.939) (0.825) (1.116) (0.884) (1.180)
COC× Industry33 -4.019*** -4.086*** -3.746*** -4.216*** -3.450*** -4.007***
(0.828) (1.056) (0.943) (1.243) (1.036) (1.355)
COC× Industry34 -2.675*** -3.172*** -2.286*** -3.407*** -1.891** -2.883**
(0.782) (0.968) (0.859) (1.150) (0.919) (1.241)
COC× Industry35 -2.533*** -2.561*** -2.203*** -2.863*** -1.768** -2.110*
(0.641) (0.825) (0.731) (1.009) (0.796) (1.105)
COC× Industry36 -1.114 -1.279 -0.798 -1.687 -0.542 -1.516
(0.786) (1.017) (0.903) (1.229) (0.987) (1.337)
COC× Industry37 -0.587 -1.722 -0.003 -2.386* 0.6 -2.183
(0.980) (1.158) (1.041) (1.314) (1.081) (1.364)
COC× Industry38 -2.993*** -4.094*** -2.560*** -4.711*** -2.045** -4.912***
(0.789) (1.011) (0.871) (1.204) (0.930) (1.256)
∆COC 12.523*** 12.586*** 19.447***
(1.158) (1.260) (2.324)
L1∆COC 7.253*** 11.944*** 15.606***
(0.688) (1.147) (1.549)
L2∆COC 4.863*** 11.714*** 12.592***
(0.483) (1.133) (1.271)
Constant -1.007*** -0.571*** -1.091*** -0.311 -1.197*** -1.101***
(0.157) (0.220) (0.178) (0.268) (0.193) (0.276)
Observations 32,126 21,212 24,835 13,994 21,212 10,414
R-squared 0.038 0.04 0.035 0.039 0.032 0.037
Plant FE N N N N N N
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
COC (pooled) -3.836*** -2.944*** -3.892*** -3.397*** -3.600*** -4.542***
(0.525) (0.673) (0.622) (0.773) (0.673) (0.929)
Elasticity (pooled) -3.836 -2.944 -3.892 -3.397 -3.600 -4.542
K is the capital stock, Y is output and COC is the user cost of capital. Robust standard errors in parentheses
(clustered at the plant level). All variables winsorized at the 1% and 99% of the empirical distribution. *,**,***
significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Industry codes: 31 - Food, beverages and tobacco; 32 - Textiles and
leather products; 33 - Wood industries and products; 34 - Paper, printing and publishing industries; 35 -
Chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic; 36 - Nonmetalic minerals; 37 - Basic metal industries; 38 -
Machinery and equipment, and other metal products.
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Table 10: Investment response to changes in the user cost by Country of Majority Ownership
Iit
Kit−1 = αi +
∑11
l=1 βl(COClit × CountryOwnDummyil) + γ CFitKit−1 + ηt + ²it
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1996-2002 Tax System 1996-2002 Avg. Ownership
COC× Mexico -0.985*** W-W -0.980*** 88.4%
(0.263) (35%) (0.263)
COC× United States -1.462** W-W 6.3%
(0.578) (39.3%)
COC× United Kingdom -2.059* W-W 0.4%
(1.229) (30%)
COC× Japan -0.086 W-W 0.4%
(0.768) (40.9%)
COC× Germany -1.920*** Terr. 1.1%
(0.745) (38.9%)
COC× Switzerland -1.632*** Terr. 0.6%
(0.619) (24.4%)
COC× France 0.297 Terr. 0.5%
(1.426) (35.4%)
COC× Netherlands 0.645 Terr. 0.5%
(1.324) (34.5%)
COC× Canada -0.962 Terr. 0.3%
(1.790) (38.6%)
COC× Worldwide Tax -1.357***
(0.511)
COC× Territorial Tax -1.052**
(0.525)
CF/K 0.049*** 0.049***
(0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.306*** 0.305***
(0.061) (0.061)
Observations 23,779 23,779
R-squared 0.237 0.237
Plant FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
In Column (2), W-W and Terr refer to Worldwide and Territorial taxation of foreign income, respectively; the
number in parenthesis is the top statutory corporate tax rate effective in 2002, including state and local taxes
(OECD (1991)). Column (4) shows the average ownership percentage across the sample of plants. I is
investment, K is the capital stock, COC is the user cost of capital CF is cash flow. Robust standard errors in
parentheses (clustered at the “4-digit industry × region (3MMA or OAD)” level). All variables winsorized at
the 1% and 99% of the empirical distribution. *,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 3MMA
stands for the region including the three main metropolitan areas. OAD stands for the region outside these
metropolitan areas, where the accelerated depreciation applied.
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Table 11: Evidence on the reaction of the price of capital goods to changes in the user cost
V ariableit
Kit−1 = αi + βCOCit + γ
CFit
Kit−1 + ηt + ²it
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1994-2002 1996-2002
All K Domestic Imported All K Domestic Imported
COC -0.236 0.075 -0.378*** -1.022*** -0.402** -0.546***
(0.194) (0.135) (0.091) (0.259) (0.185) (0.122)
CF/K 0.046*** 0.030*** 0.006*** 0.049*** 0.033*** 0.007***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant 0.154*** 0.05 0.116*** 0.346*** 0.165*** 0.157***
(0.050) (0.035) (0.021) (0.067) (0.047) (0.029)
Observations 32,443 32,443 32,443 24,959 24,959 24,959
R-squared 0.197 0.207 0.223 0.24 0.248 0.267
Plant FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Elasticity -0.355 0.172 -2.121 -1.517 -0.899 -3.058
I is investment, K is the capital stock, COC is the user cost of capital and CF is cash flow. Robust standard
errors in parentheses (clustered at the “4-digit industry × region (3MMA or OAD)” level). All variables
winsorized at the 1% and 99% of the empirical distribution. *,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively. 3MMA stands for the region including the three main metropolitan areas. OAD stands for the
region outside these metropolitan areas, where the accelerated depreciation applied. The user cost for imported
capital is adjusted to consider changes in the foreign exchange rate.
51
Figure 1: Standardized Actual and Mandated Investment Rates
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Figure 2: Actual and Mandated Investment Rates and the Average Adjustment Function
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Table 12: Investment response to changes in the user cost by asset type
Iijt
Kijt−1 = αij + βCOCijt + γ
CFijt
Kijt−1 + ηt + ²ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1996-2002
Pooled Separated
COC -1.701*** -1.771***
(0.246) (0.252)
COC (Mach. & Eq.) -1.405*** -1.467***
-0.218 -0.223
COC (Constructions) -0.925*** -1.021***
-0.279 -0.275
COC (Land) -1.816*** -1.981***
-0.316 -0.326
COC (Transp. Eq.) -2.297*** -2.351***
-0.338 -0.348
CF/K 0.003*** 0.003***
0.000 0.000
Constant 0.493*** 0.548*** 0.499*** 0.552***
(0.056) (0.062) (0.055) (0.060)
Observations 72,765 69,362 72,765 69,362
R-squared 0.196 0.212 0.196 0.213
Plant×Asset FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Elasticity (Mach. & Eq.) -2.619 -2.419 -2.163 -2.259
I is investment, K is the capital stock, COC is the user cost of capital and CF is cash flow. Robust standard
errors in parentheses (clustered at the “4-digit industry × region (3MMA or OAD) × asset” level). All variables
winsorized at the 1% and 99% of the empirical distribution. *,**,*** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively. 3MMA stands for the region including the three main metropolitan areas. OAD stands for the
region outside these metropolitan areas, where the accelerated depreciation applied.
54
Table 13: Implications for Tax Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Using 2002 I/K
Elasticity
−1.5 −2.0
COC ∆COC/COC I/K
Approved Tax changes:
2002 0.231 Base 0.0904 0.0904
2003 0.198 -0.141 0.1093 0.1156
2004 0.196 -0.013 0.1115 0.1187
2005 0.195 -0.004 0.1122 0.1197
10% ITC (2003) 0.174 -0.246 0.1240 0.1352
Full Expensing (2003) 0.168 -0.273 0.1266 0.1387
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Using average 1994-2002 I/K
Elasticity
−1.5 −2.0
COC ∆COC/COC I/K
Approved Tax changes:
2002 0.231 Base 0.1630 0.1630
2003 0.198 -0.141 0.1974 0.2088
2004 0.196 -0.013 0.2013 0.2144
2005 0.195 -0.004 0.2027 0.2164
10% ITC (2003) 0.174 -0.246 0.2232 0.2433
Full Expensing (2003) 0.168 -0.273 0.2294 0.2516
I is investment, K is the capital stock, COC is the user cost of capital. All numbers are derived from
calculations at the 4-digit industry level and separately for each region (3MMA or OAD). The aggregation is
done using as weights the capital stock in 2002 in each 4-digit industry. 3MMA stands for the region including
the three main metropolitan areas. OAD stands for the region outside these metropolitan areas, where the
accelerated depreciation applied.
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Table A-1: Depreciation rates for selected assets and industries, 2002
Asset NDR OAD
Constructions 0.05 0.57
Railroad tracks 0.05 0.57
Railroad cars and locomotives 0.06 0.62
Office furniture and equipment 0.10
Boats 0.06 0.62
Airplanes 0.10
Automobiles, buses and trucks 0.25
Personal computers, servers, printers, etc. 0.30 0.88
Dices, dies, molds, matrices and toolbox 0.35 0.89
Telephone communication towers and cables 0.05 0.57
Radio systems 0.08 0.69
Telephone transmission equipment 0.10 0.74
Satellite equipment on space 0.08 0.69
Satellite on land equipment 0.10 0.74
Industry NDR OAD
Generation, conduction and distribution of electricity; grain milling, sugar
production, oil manufacturing and marine transportation
0.05 0.57
Basic metal production, tobacco manufacturing and production of derivatives
of coal
0.06 0.62
Manufacturing of paper; extraction and processing of petroleum and natural
gas
0.07 0.66
Manufacturing of motor vehicles and parts, railroads and ships, machinery,
professional and scientific instruments; elaboration of nutritional products and
beverages
0.08 0.69
Manufacturing of leather, chemical and petrochemical, plastic and rubber
products; printing and graphical publishing
0.09 0.71
Electrical transportation 0.10 0.74
Manufacturing of textile products 0.11 0.75
Mining industry, construction of airships, load and passengers motor trans-
portation
0.12 0.77
Aerial transportation and communication services 0.16 0.81
Restaurants 0.20 0.84
Construction; agricultural, cattle, forestry and fishing activities 0.25 0.87
Research and development 0.35 0.89
Manufacturing and assembling of magnetic components and hard disks 0.50 0.92
Production of natural gas and pollution control 1.00
All other activities 0.10 0.74
Source: Federal Income Tax Laws (Ley del Impuesto Sobre la Renta). NDR: Normal Depreciation Rate
(Straight Line Method). OADR: Optional Accelerated Depreciation Rate (First year only).
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